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The rules of the trade policy arena differ from those in academia. How can an 
economic researcher survive, let alone thrive, in what may appear to be a trade 
policy jungle? The purpose of this paper is not just to offer guidance in this respect 
but also to think through the factors that determine the supply and demand for timely, 
relevant policy-relevant insights into commercial policy matters. Understanding the 
latter provides much of the rationale for the former. Advice follows analysis, as it 
should do. Economic researchers have certain advantages that they can make 
immediate use of in the jungle and maybe some baggage that they would do well to 
shed.    3
1.0 Introduction 
 
Leading trade negotiators invoke facts and research findings in support of their 
positions an awful lot. Seminars and conferences on commercial policy matters are 
held in Washington, D.C., Brussels, and Geneva on a regular basis and typically 
feature one or two academic speakers. In the run up to important summits and 
deadlines for trade negotiators, newspapers publish plenty of op-ed articles and 
letters on the pros and cons of various trade policy options. These observations 
suggest there is considerable scope for disseminating the policy recommendations of 
academic research on trade, especially during an era where empirical international 
trade research has grown in profile. But the rules of the policy arena are different 
from those in academia. How can an academic survive, let alone thrive, in what may 
appear to be a trade policy jungle? The purpose of this paper is not merely to offer 
tips in this respect--much like a glorified "how to" guide--but also to think through the 
factors which determine the supply and demand for policy-relevant insights into 
commercial policy matters. Understanding the latter provides much of the rationale 
for the former.
1 Advice follows analysis, as it should do. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organised into three more sections: an account of the 
supply and demand for policy-relevant insights into commercial policy options; ten 
tips on substance and form for newcomers concerning surviving (and hopefully 
thriving) in the trade policy jungle; and then some closing remarks.
2 
 
2.0  The Supply and Demand for Insights into Commercial Policy 
 
The metaphor "trade policy jungle" is deliberately used here so as to distinguish what 
goes on in trade policy-making (broadly conceived) with what happens in academia. 
Presumably we know how the latter place works (or after, at most, a couple of years 
as an assistant professor in the United States one ought to know). How should one 
begin to think about the trade policy jungle? Surely the right place to start is to 
examine the demand and supply side of the market for the product in question, the 
product here being timely, relevant insights into the efficacy of different 
                                                            
1 It occurs to me that many of the arguments that follow may be unduly influenced by my own experi-
ence in the United States and in Europe. Of course, I have travelled much more widely but there is still 
the lingering doubt that I may not understand how things work in other places as well as I might in my 
own backyard. 
2 The reader may be wondering what the author knows about the trade policy jungle. Definitely less 
than some and probably more than most academic trade economists. He certainly has not been a 
trade negotiator or, thank heavens, a lobbyist. Instead, over the last 10 years since getting his Ph.D. in 
economics he has made numerous forays into the trade policy jungle returning, more or less in one 
piece, to the warm hearth of academia. For ten years he held fellowships at the Brookings Institution in 
Washington, D.C., where he set up and ran the Brookings Roundtable on Trade and Investment Policy 
(an off-the-record forum for discussions among Washington trade policy apparatchiks), undertook two 
stints at the World Bank (where anyone serious about understanding the relationships between inter-
national trade and developing countries should spend some time), acted as rapporteur of numerous 
OECD and WTO events, and has finished more policy-relevant writings and edited volumes that he 
cares to remember. (For your information a "rapporteur" is a glorified conference secretary who gets to 
sum up the main findings of the event in question. The rapporteur is often asked to write up the princi-
pal report on the conference, which forms part of the public record.) Moreover, he has spoken at over 
125 public policy events (ostensibly on trade policy and related matters), often giving more than one 
presentation. Those are my credentials. Make of them what you want.   4
commercial policy options.
3 I will start by analysing the incentives faced by each 
type of supply-side participant. As you'd expect "incentives matter" in the trade policy 
jungle, just as they do in many other areas of life. 
 
The supply side of this market comprises some academics, certain non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), think tanks and research institutes, lobbyists and industry 
associations, a number of international organisations, and some researchers in 
government departments or independent state offices or commissions. The location 
of these market participants is geographically concentrated in Washington, D.C., 
Geneva, and Brussels. Pockets of suppliers can be found in Paris and London. 
Before considering the incentives faced by these participants, I should describe what 
these agents tend to supply. In terms of content there are at least four types of output 
supplied, namely, analyses of trade policy decisions and others shocks in multiple-
market (often general equilibrium) models, similar analyses in specific markets (such 
as agricultural markets), purpose-built models and empirical approaches to assess a 
specific commercial policy problem, and the collection, organisation, and presentation 
of relevant data. This content is presented in many forms, including academic 
papers, shorter briefing notes, reports (official and others), pamphlets, op-ed pieces 
in newspapers, on-line blogs, and is disseminated through many different media. 
 
Starting with academia we know (as our American friends say) "what the deal is" with 
respect to public policy relevant research, at least in international trade. By and large 
there is a strong dislike for this research because, in part, it is seen as being 
"lightweight" compared to the "depth" that one can apparently reach with theoretical 
and econometric tools. This reluctance to write papers with direct policy relevance 
has at least two important consequences, the first of which is that there are few 
people who can referee papers with substantial policy content because either the 
policy instruments themselves or the decision-making processes surrounding them 
are not well understood by the "representative" trade economist. The second result is 
that fewer and fewer doctoral candidates have been trained how to undertake policy-
relevant research. This, in turn, has led to fewer economists being appointed to the 
better research institutes or think tanks with a strong interest in trade policy. For 
example, from 1993 to 2003 only three freshly-minted Ph.D.s in international 
economics (not just international trade) from first-tier U.S. universities were offered 
posts at serious Washington D.C.-based think tanks. This has contributed to a 
reduction in the supply of decent policy-relevant papers on trade policy. More 
generally, academia's steady retreat from policy-relevant work on international trade 
has created a vacuum that others have been all too happy to fill. 
 
The second group of suppliers are those holding posts at think tanks and research 
institutes. It is important to differentiate between two (almost distinct) groups here: 
the former senior trade negotiator or trade policy official and those who have pursued 
primarily research throughout their careers. Members of both groups are, in principle, 
                                                            
3 As in any market, the parameters influencing the supply and demand sides of the market may well 
change over time. It would be wrong, therefore, to read the following account as implying that there is 
a static market for timely, relevant insights into the efficacy of different commercial policy options. I 
thank Bob Wolfe for reminding me to remind readers of this important point. A different matter raised 
by Prof. Wolfe is whether a form of Says Law applied to this market. That is, could an entrepreneurial 
academic create the demand from policymakers for their recommendations? There may well be in-
tertemporal relationships between the past decisions on one side of the market and the incentives 
faced by current and future participants on the other side of the market.    5
capable of producing what could past muster as good applied international research 
in academia, although the latter group tends to produce such work more often. The 
former tend to have large networks of national and international contacts, which has 
a pro and a con as far as their writings on trade policy is concerned. The pro is that 
their analyses tend to be better attuned than most to the policy-related priorities of 
the day and the actual mechanics of trade policy decision-making. The con is that, 
perhaps so as not to jeopardise their networks of contacts (which are one of their 
major sources of information), they tend to articulate middle-of-the-road policy 
recommendations. Overall, this type tends to produce informative but not particularly 
path-breaking trade policy research. 
 
The never-ending search for funding can influence the topics researched at think 
tanks and research institutes. For a long time no Washington-based think tank 
touched economic development matters, but a slew of funding has altered this state 
of affairs in the past seven years. Perhaps more pertinently for trade policy, financial 
support for research projects and conferences on regional initiatives tends to be 
stronger than for international/multilateral initiatives, manifesting itself in many more 
books being published by think tanks on preferential trade agreements than on the 
WTO. 
 
Incentives appear to shape the trade policy-related activities of NGOs too.
4 The 
search for funding, and the implied need to differentiate any given NGO from the 
pack has, given the longstanding governmental and "establishment" support for 
multilateralism and freer trade, left NGOs only with the "critical" end of the spectrum 
of commentary on trade policy open to them.
5 It is hard to find newspaper articles for 
NGO reports that support the status quo, and without evidence of media impact, 
many funding sources dry up. Incidentally, it is worth bearing these considerations in 
mind when deciding whether to respond to a piece of NGO work that you disapprove 
of. 
 
The international organisations are an important source of supply of policy-relevant 
research on commercial policy. The World Bank stands out in this respect, having a 
dedicated group of very active researchers producing lots of papers every year. That, 
plus one or two flagship annual publications to market their research, gives the World 
Bank a formidable advantage in the jungle. The OECD probably comes second in 
terms of the quantity of research produced, although the latter's policy 
recommendations are more finely drawn. UNCTAD, the IMF, and the WTO have 
some economists who contribute papers and reports that, from time to time, get a lot 
of attention. 
 
At their best researchers at international organisations capitalise on three 
advantages that they have over most other players in the jungle, namely, access to 
more and better quality data, better knowledge of the institutional processes for 
decision-making at the national and the international level, and ample
6 support for 
research assistance and travel. When their research falls short usually it is because 
of partisan bureaucratic entrepreneurship or self censorship, the latter results in 
                                                            
4 Note the word "shape" was used in this sentence, and not the phrase "entirely determine". 
5 Perhaps this should be thought of as a form of locational competition! 
6 Relatively speaking, of course.   6
certain subjects not being researched at all or certain policy implications not being 
drawn. 
 
International organisations acquire reputations, parts of which are specific to their 
output of trade policy research and parts are broader and institution-related, and this 
colours how their staffs' papers are received in the jungle. The OECD, for example, 
has acquired an excellent reputation for documenting, monitoring, and quantifying 
agricultural trade barriers. In contrast, it is unclear how over the last five years the 
World Bank's substantial revisions to its Computable General Equilibrium (CGE)-
generated estimates of the benefits of completing the Doha Round have advanced its 
reputation as a reliable source of trade policy advice.
7 Incidentally, such have been 
the changes to the magnitudes of these estimates that the Director-General of the 
World Trade Organization, Mr. Lamy, now balks at referring to CGE estimates in his 
speeches. Credibility matters in the jungle.  
 
Institutions also acquire broader reputations that, rightly or wrongly, colour how their 
trade policy research and its associated policy recommendations are received. It has 
to be said that the backlash against the Washington Consensus, which accelerated 
after the East Asian financial crisis in 1997-98, has made readers in many developing 
countries more cautious of any policy recommendations to further liberalise trade 
policy in research authored by World Bank and IMF staff. All of these observations 
have a bearing on deciding with whom, and under what circumstances, you might 
want to collaborate in the trade policy jungle. 
 
A final group of suppliers worth noting are those based in independent state 
commissions or offices that advise governments or the legislature on trade policy 
matters. As is often the case, such arrangements have been formalised and 
implemented more transparently in the United States, where the U.S. International 
Trade Commission, the General Accounting Office, and the Congressional Research 
Service frequently provide informative research on pressing trade policy matters. 
Admittedly, this research tends not to have sharp policy recommendations, but skilful 
drafters know how to guide the reader (and newcomers to the jungle should be 
aware of this). In Europe the comparable arrangements are more ad hoc or informal. 
For example, the European Commission inevitably commissions from outside experts 
a Sustainable Impact Assessment of each trade negotiation that it undertakes (and 
sometimes those assessments are updated after the negotiation is completed). The 
scope of these assessments are normally so broad (recall the "sustainability" label) 
that they are undertaken by teams of academics, NGO staff, and think tank experts. 




Looking across the suppliers of such work, with a few noticeable exceptions, the 
analysis of border measures (such as tariffs and quotas) is far better developed than 
that for the so-called behind-the-border measures that are found increasingly in trade 
agreements. The empirical tools used in the jungle are, by and large, drawn from 
those developed in academia or developed in collaboration with those in academia, 
which is valuable to those operating in either milieu. There are of course differences, 
                                                            
7 I accept that there can be perfectly good reasons why CGE estimates of the same trade reform may 
change (such as improved underlying data etc.) 
8 Although the breadth of these Assessments is such that economic arguments can get drowned out 
by other (potentially legitimate) considerations.   7
perhaps the most obvious being that there are many more analyses of trade 
negotiating strategies written in the jungle than in economics academia.
9 
 
On the demand side for relevant insights on commercial policy options, it may be 
useful to pose the following questions: Who? What? When? and Where? Of course, 
the deeper question underlying all these questions is Why? That is, why do trade 
policy decision-makers and their advisers seek such insights in the first place? I will 
touch on this latter question towards the end of this section. As to "Who?" let me 
make one brief point before moving on. Not surprisingly, many of the academic 
economists who teach public policy-related courses often assign research papers 
with policy implications to their students, creating one form of demand. My focus in 
what follows, however, is on the demand emanating from outside of academia. 
 
With respect to the other potential demanders of policy-relevant insights, the ultimate 
source of demand is the fact that trade policymakers have to make large numbers of 
different and often controversial decisions. Those decisions relate not just to the 
World Trade Organization and associated negotiations, ministerial meetings, and 
trade disputes, but also to national debates over trade reform, bilateral relations with 
other countries, regional and plurilateral commercial policy initiatives. For sure, some 
of these decisions will be determined entirely on non-economic grounds, including 
political expediency and legal considerations. However, there are many trade policy 
discussions where the effects of a possible decision are of interest and, to the extent 




The need to take decisions creates a demand for advice, which is principally provided 
by officials, lobbyists, NGOs, and commentaries in the media. This, in turn, generates 
a derived demand for economic research findings that speak precisely to the matter 
at hand.
11 Officials play an important role in sorting through the disparate claims 
made and selecting which findings get distilled into the advice given to decision-
makers, such as trade ministers.
12 
 
Concerning "What?" it is important to recall that trade policy decision-makers, and by 
implication the derived demanders of policy-relevant economic research, are often 
interested in a wider set of effects than those stressed during a conventional training 
in neoclassical economics. For example, trade policymakers are often interested in 
the extent of adjustment in the labour and product markets (that is, in plain English, 
                                                            
9 As far as the analysis of actual trade negotiating strategies is concerned, scholars in the fields of 
international relations, international policy economy, and political science have given these matters far 
more attention than economists. 
10 This includes not just assessing the effects of any one potential action but also to assess the merits 
of different options available to a decision-maker.  
11 One trade official pointed out that some of the demand for economic analysis comes from policy-
makers seeking to justify decisions that they have already made. One successful academic trade 
economist, who has made plenty of policy-relevant contributions, argued that this particular "validation 
function" of some academic research, which essentially caters to certain pre-conceived notions of 
some policymakers, is what occasionally puts him off forays into the jungle. There are for sure no 
guarantees that academic research findings won't be misinterpreted or otherwise abused in the trade 
policy jungle.  
12 There are limits to this derived-demand argument for economic analysis. The fact that policymakers 
need to make decisions does not automatically imply that they (directly or indirectly through their offi-
cials) will seek economic analysis and advice.   8
the magnitude and location of job losses, lost output, and any associated spending 
by government) caused by a trade reform, the likely speed of adjustment, as well as 
who gains, who loses, and over what time frame. A necessary condition for success 
in the jungle is listening to "what" is being demanded and identifying the metrics by 
which policy options are really evaluated. This is much more preferable to parroting 
statements about consumer surplus, producer surplus, and deadweight losses.
13 
 
With respect to the question "When?",  timing is not everything but it is extremely 
important. By and large, trade policy decisions and the preparation of advice for 
decision-makers follow established processes, associated with which are 
approximate timetables. Judging when to circulate a piece of research, so that it is 
read and considered while advice is being compiled in advance of a decision, is a 
skill worth acquiring. Some examples may be instructive. The first half of 2006 would 
have been an excellent time to circulate an innovative piece of research on Aid for 
Trade. Why? Because at the WTO Ministerial Meeting in December 2005 trade 
ministers launched a six month-long WTO process to consider this matter.
14 Here is 
another example: the Doha Ministerial Declaration, issued in November 2001, made 
clear that WTO members (in effect, their trade ministers) would decide at the 
following Ministerial meeting whether to launch negotiations on the four so-called 
Singapore Issues.
15 The interval between these Ministerial meetings is typically one-
and-a-half to two years which gave me time to assemble an accessible and 
(hopefully informative) edited volume on these matters for distribution three months 
before the latter (the Cancun) Ministerial Conference.
16 In sum, while not everything 
in the trade policy calendar is planned and set in stone, the institutional and official 
processes associated with decision-making on trade policy creates enough 
predictability for informed researchers to plan ahead.
17 
 
The question of timing has another implication. Beware of trade policy matters, 
however apparently important and systemic, that do not have a major reform decision 
which many senior trade policymakers will have to focus on in the foreseeable future. 
Two important examples come to mind. The first is the WTO's accession process 
which has determined the terms upon which over twenty countries have joined the 
multilateral trading system since 1995. As we are learning, not least by watching 
China's negotiating tactics during the Doha Round, the terms upon which countries 
are acceding to the WTO are so out of line with those obligations taken on by existing 
WTO members at similar levels of development that the former are demanding that 
                                                            
13 In the jungle you might want to refer to these as customer savings, firm competitiveness (if appro-
priate), and waste, respectively. 
14 Andrew Charlton and Joseph Stiglitz wrote a report on Aid for Trade for the Commonwealth Secre-
tariat that received considerable attention during this period. 
15 The four matters in question were the interaction between trade and investment policy, the interac-
tion between trade and competition policy, transparency in government procurement practices, and 
trade facilitation. 
16 The initiative was arguably a success. One measure of this success is that the four chapters of that 
edited volume were downloaded more than 25,000 times from one website alone in the twelve months 
after that volume was released. 
17 None of this discussion on timing, and what follows, is meant to suggest that the only socially valu-
able policy-relevant research is dictated by the timetables for decision-making by trade policymakers. 
For example, the development of theoretical and empirical tools that allow for more accurate estimates 
of trade policy instruments could have important long-term payoffs for policymaking and for society. 
Economists operating in the jungle are downstream users of some of the tools developed in academia 
and should certainly welcome advances in this regard.   9
little be asked of them during the current multilateral trade negotiation. This, in turn, 
suggests the fallout from the WTO accession process is not limited or time-bound as 
some would like to think. Suppose that one considers this to be a systemic issue, as 
far as timing is concerned it is important to remember that there are no high-profile 
decisions concerning the organisation and terms of the WTO accession process that 
senior trade policy makers are scheduled to take in the near future.
18 The result: a 
small demand for policy-relevant insights into this matter. The second example is 
reform of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding.
19 This subject, it seems, 
attracts endless comment from practicing and academic international trade lawyers 
and public international lawyers, but given there are no major decisions scheduled to 
be taken on this subject, where is the real demand from decision-makers for policy-
relevant insights on DSU reform? 
 
The question "Where?" indicates the need to think about the fora in which to make 
policy-related interventions. Undoubtedly getting an op-ed published in the Financial 
Times or some newspaper of comparable repute will get some attention for a set of 
policy recommendations.
20 However, in terms of impact little beats giving 
presentations at events where (ideally) lots of decision-makers, or more likely those 
who advise them, are in attendance. Fortunately, international trade policy has a 
large number of such events devoted to it in Washington, D.C., Geneva, Brussels, 
and Paris. The WTO, OECD, some of the regional development banks (such as the 
Inter-American Development Bank) and bodies such as the Commonwealth 
Secretariat organise events in other locations, typically in developing countries. 
Prominence in the jungle, therefore, requires a willingness to travel to these events 
and to participate in these events on policymakers' terms. The latter means, often, 
making short (sometimes very short) clear presentations that focus on the findings 
and relevance of your work for current policy discussions. Knowledge of those 
discussions and how the associated decisions will be taken is, therefore, a pre-
requisite for successful dissemination. 
 
Finally, I come to the question of "Why?" or motive. No doubt, having studied the 
models of political economy of trade policy, the cynic in you might argue that 
decision-makers and advisers are only interested in research findings to the extent 
that they support their pre-determined positions. Undoubtedly there are situations 
when this is true.
 21 However, there are plenty of trade policy matters where decision-
                                                            
18 This is not to say that decisions on an individual country's accession to the WTO do not get attention 
from policymakers, rather that the process for negotiating accession is not scheduled for reform any-
time soon. 
19 As opposed to commentary on the rulings of the relevant Panels and Appellate Body. 
20 With the rise of the internet, both as a place to post research findings as well as a means for dis-
semination, the domination of the traditional media over policy commentary has weakened considera-
bly. Moreover as many senior policymakers appear to read far less than their predecessors, then oral 
presentations and pithy articles have grown in importance as dissemination devices.   
21 An important activity of trade policymakers is negotiation with counterparts from other jurisdictions. 
Bob Wolfe pointed out that political scientists have usefully made the distinction between negotiations 
in which the parties "bargain" and those in which they "argue". If I have understood this distinction 
correctly, in the former each party knows with certainty its interests and position and, presumably 
therefore, policymakers will be looking for research findings that corroborate their position and refute 
the position of others. "Arguing," on the other hand, involves negotiations when there is some dispute 
or uncertainty as to what is really in each party's interests. In this situation, research findings can con-
tribute to a discussion of the relative efficacy of different options before negotiators, and may well add 
to the number of options before negotiators. Some of the so-called behind-the-border provisions (or   10
makers (or their advisers) have instincts as to what the right approach to take is, but 
are unclear as to the specifics. Alternatively, when it is widely accepted that a current 
aspect of trade policy is not working, then there may be a greater willingness to listen 
to innovative and relevant ideas. This is not to say that officials are necessarily willing 
to go back to the drawing board and conceive of completely changing their priors--
instead, that there is an openness to new ideas so long as they fall within certain 
parameters. Here the academic's role of "informing" policymakers comes to the fore. 
I would argue that many, not all, of the behind-the-border matters in trade 
agreements are ones where policymakers have a broad sense of what they want to 
achieve but the specific details, and sometimes even options, in that regard are not 
something they have necessarily fixed their views on.  
 
The purpose of this section was to reflect on the supply and demand factors that 
operate in the trade policy jungle. There are, for sure, some matters that were not 
addressed here such as how does the associated "market clears"--that might be 
taken to mean which policy recommendations are ultimately adopted and which ones 
are eventually ignored or discarded.
22 Despite its evident importance, the latter 
matter is a very difficult one to come to any general conclusions about, especially as 
political decision-making may differ markedly across countries and over time. Another 
unexplored issue is what constitutes "successful" activity by an academic in the trade 
policy jungle.
23 Even so, the above discussion of the demand side provided some 
indications as to the attributes prized in the jungle and arguably some of them differ 
from those honed in doctoral programmes and valued in academia. On the basis of 
this discussion of the factors underlying the supply and demand for policy-relevant 
findings on commercial policy matters, the next section provides a few tips to 
newcomers as to how to make more successful forays into the trade policy jungle. 
 
3.0  Surviving in the Trade Policy Jungle: Some Tips for Newcomers 
 
Had this been a corporate strategy article in the Harvard Business Review 
(HBR) this section would probably have started by arguing that survival in the jungle 
is not a matter of connections or good fortune.
24 Picking up the tempo the HBR article 
would assert: Conscious decision-making based on a multi-step analysis of the 
jungle's characteristics will help the newcomer position themselves advantageously, 
avoiding various lions' dens and using their novelty potentially to put distance 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
provisions on domestic regulations) in trade agreements may more often be the subject of "arguing" 
than "bargaining." 
22 I suppose that the ten tips outlined in the next section include various attributes, actions, and con-
tingencies that jointly determine the chances that an academic's time in the jungle will influence the 
decisions taken by policymakers and their advisers. 
23 Leaving aside personal motivations (consulting income, paid-for international travel, etc) and poten-
tial benefits, what is the correct social metric? Is it contributing to the adoption and implementation of 
trade policies that are less distortionary, that enhance the overall level of support for trade reform, or 
that enable producers and consumers to take better advantage of the international commercial oppor-
tunities available to them? Another difficulty in evaluating success is attribution. Policymakers may 
listen to many sources of advice and not all of them will disagree. Moreover, not all advice is given 
publicly, making external assessments of an academic economist's success hard to evaluate. There 
may well have been many quiet victories which an academic's research findings may have contributed 
towards. None of this should be read as implying that success in academic circles can be unambigu-
ously evaluated, although arguably some of the challenges in assessing the influence of academic 
research on fellow academics are different from those associated with the trade policy arena. 
24 Can you guess which corporate strategy "guru" I am imitating?   11
between themselves and incumbents whose room for manoeuvre are often 
constrained by their well known opinions and habits. And, maybe, that wouldn't be a 
bad way to start this section as well! In what follows are a number of suggestions on 
substance and on form. They come with the proviso "for what they are worth."  
 
 
3.1   On Substance 
 
The following tips might be useful in deciding the best topic(s) or policy 
question(s) to earn your spurs with in the jungle. Equally importantly if, like me, you 
believe one of the most important purposes of economic inquiry is to better 
understand human choice, then the following suggestions may not seem so alien 
after all. For sure, not all of the tools that economists hone in graduate school will get 
used if the following advice is taken on board, but that doesn't imply that the analysis 
of decision-making by trade policymaking is any less substantive. 
 
i) The most significant determinant of the demand for policy-relevant research is a 
looming decision by policy makers 
 
There are few major debates in the trade policy jungle on subjects for which no 
important decision is pending. Most of the jungle's inhabitants are just too busy 
dealing with what has to be decided here and now to have the luxury to debate other 
issues. For example, watch out for the yawns if someone raises the broader issue of 
the relative merits of bilateralism, regionalism, and multilateralism.
25 If exposure is 
what you seek, a related point is to be wary of undertaking research projects whose 
likely policy recommendations are unlikely to be in any major decision-maker's "in 
box" in the foreseeable future. 
 
ii) Deadlines for policy decisions determine when policy-relevant research is needed 
 
Surrounding most senior governmental decision-makers are officials and a 
bureaucratic machinery that is supposed to aid the decision-maker. That machinery 
often anticipates when a final decision has to be taken and works backwards in time, 
creating an approximate schedule for when officials prepare their advice and may be 
looking out for the latest insights relevant to the decision to be taken. Moreover, in 
trade policy matters many international organisations seek to convene meetings 
before big decisions are made. National governments may "reach out" to "civil 
society" and other "stakeholders" (forgive the descent into soft-left jargon!) All of 
these initiatives help determine the time-frame in which there may be demand for 
policy-relevant research findings. Thought given to these considerations facilitates 
planning on the researcher's behalf. 
 
Given the time and energy necessary to learn about the trade policy jungle and 
associated actors and institutions, there is probably a strong case for specialisation at 
least at the beginning. In which case the number of likely decisions on a given trade 
policy matter will probably influence the cost-benefit analysis of specialising in a 
                                                            
25 One earlier reader of this paper argued that, with the suspension of the Doha Round in July 2006, 
perhaps the relative merits of multilateralism, regionalism, and bilateralism will receive more attention 
from senior policymakers. This argument may turn out be correct but I doubt it. My suspicion remains 
that policymakers will continue to consider this matter indirectly, probably in response to significant 
developments along any one negotiating track.   12
given area of policy-related expertise. Antidumping investigations and decisions, for 
example, are made on a frequent basis in many jurisdictions and may provide ample 
opportunities to engage with policymakers and others. Other areas of commercial 
policy may be far less active (but could have greater economic significance and 
higher profile). 
  
iii) Not every high profile discussion is a prelude to a decision 
 
Certain trade policy topics may well reflect the genuine concerns of some parties but 
are couched in such a way that their primary tactical purpose is to lay down markers 
that will be taken up at a subsequent stage in a negotiation. In my view, the subject 
of Special and Differential Treatment in the Doha Round is the perfect example of 
this.
26 At issue here is not the legitimacy of the concern, more the manner in which it 
is advanced. In a trade negotiation, like the Doha Round, where "nothing is agreed 
until everything is agreed" the resolution of uncertainty on a specific subject (which 
good research can sometimes facilitate) may well be the last thing that those putting 
down markers on that subject want; instead they want discussions on this subject to 
go on and on (to indicate the seriousness which they attach to the subject) until the 
negotiation is finalised. Other negotiators understand this, and seeing little to gain 
from refusing to discuss a subject, may acquiesce and let the discussion continue. 
The problem for the researcher is that the subject in question will look like it is getting 
a lot of attention, but don't be fooled. When is the decision to be taken? Only at the 
end of the negotiation, which is exactly when decision-makers are likely to be taking 
many other decisions. The effective demand for policy insights in this context is likely 
to be low or, at best, very brief. 
 
iv)  Understanding policymaking processes and their consequences is a serious 
business--it is not for part-timers, moon-lighters, and those uninterested in 
institutional detail 
 
The foregoing remarks have hopefully persuaded you that understanding the what's, 
why's, how's, and when's of decision-making by trade policymakers requires paying 
careful and persistent attention to the behaviour of a broad range of the jungle's 
inhabitants. Keeping up with those agents' choices, interpreting the content of various 
sources of information about their actions (speeches, newspaper articles, op-ed 
pieces, government reports, etc.), while watching out for changes in economic and 
other factors that influence the behaviour of these actors is neither a trivial nor a part-
time job. For one, you will have to develop a wider range of information sources than 
the data sets that economists typically use. Moreover, you will have to develop 
judgement about which sources of information are more reliable and under what 
circumstances. Furthermore, as the pieces of the puzzle fall in place, you should be 
able to gauge (certainly not perfectly) the timing of when certain matters are likely to 
be getting the attention of policymakers and, therefore, when the demand for policy-
relevant research is likely to be higher.
27 
                                                            
26 My experience as the rapporteur of the 2005 OECD Global Forum on Special and Differential 
Treatment led me to this conclusion.  
27 I would also argue that there are potential payoffs to academic trade economists in their traditional 
research activities from a greater appreciation of the trade policy-making process and its outcomes. 
There is considerable intertemporal and cross-sectional variation in the circumstances and frequency 
with which commercial policy decisions get made. Surely this variation can be better used to identify 
the effects of trade policies and the determinants of such policies? In a similar vein, I have been im-  13
To me, one of the most baffling decisions taken by some academics concerns their 
temporary forays into the trade policy jungle. All too often I hear sensible academic 
economists arguing that their latest research paper has some interesting (to them) 
policy implications and want to gain some attention for these findings. These supply-
driven decisions to enter the jungle often prove frustrating for the academic and for 
their interested audience. Why? Typically, little or no attempt is made to seriously 
identify the origins and timing of the demand for the policy findings. When the foray 
into the jungle bears little fruit, the academic concerned often concludes that the 
policymakers and officials are distracted by other factors, that they don't want to 
understand or don't care about the findings, and worse of all, that the policymaking 
process is so (um!) political and therefore (so the argument goes) beyond the 
comprehension of an academic economist. Plus, the fact that ideas are not 
expressed in the jungle with the same (apparent) sophistication as in university 
seminar rooms reinforces the impression that somehow the whole exercise is for 
lightweights. As you can imagine I don't have much sympathy for those who haven't 
bothered to understand both the supply and demand for ideas in the policy arena the 
underlying decision-making processes, and the incentives involved. Professorial 
moon-lighters beware! 
 
v) Maskus Law: "If you can't be the smartest, be the first" 
 
This gem came from Keith Maskus
28 (University of Colorado, Boulder) and it is fair to 
say that he has practised what he preached. Professor Maskus is the leading expert 
among international trade economists on the trade-related aspects of intellectual 
property rights. Not long ago he identified an uninhabited part of the jungle and 
systematically set about marking out his territory.
29 There is plenty of room to repeat 
this strategy, and doing so in a way that satisfies one's academic colleagues as well 
as allowing you to develop a serious profile in the trade policy jungle. Given the 
importance the U.S. and the European Commission continue to attach to behind-the-
border policies in the free trade agreements that they seek to negotiate and to a 
lesser extent in the Doha Round, and given that there is woefully little serious 
empirical work published on most of these matters, a carefully selected programme 
of research on some of these policies could well begin to payoff in both milieu after 
two to three years. 
 
vi) Believe it or not, an economics training provides some tangible advantages over 
many of the jungle's inhabitants 
 
A good Ph.D. training in economics confers on newcomers to the jungle advantages 
over many non-economists. The following advantages may seem to you trivial at first, 
but you should defer final judgement on this point until you have heard or read the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
pressed over the years how industrial organisation economists on both sides of the Atlantic have con-
tributed to debates over competition/antitrust law as well as writing academic papers on the serious 
conceptual and empirical matters raised by important enforcement and court decisions.  
28 In the July 2006 version of this paper I inadvertently reported Maskus Law as "If you can't be the 
best, be the first." Professor Maskus corrected my error and stated his position thus: "If you can't be 
the smartest, be the first." He went on to argue (in an email to me) that the latter formulation is more 
accurate as "being first (even when others later improve your research, which is the natural order of 
things) sometimes is being the best. Goodness knows it gives you a reputation and a first-mover ad-
vantage." 
29 So as not to further antagonise a good friend let's stop the metaphors at this point!   14
mistakes made by those whose graduate educations differ from yours. These 
advantages are, in no particular order: 
  
•  Knowledge of available data sets and how to access them, the variables 
contained therein, and what the variables purport to measure. (I told you some 
of this was basic!) 
•  Avoiding the basic pitfalls associated with preparing data and charts. 
•  An interest in quantifying effects, not just discussing them qualitatively. 
•  In general, no fear of numbers. 
•  Thinking in models that emphasise what-causes-what and (often) parsimony in 
reasoning. 
One edge that university-based academics have over many other supply-side rivals 
in the jungle is time. That is, time to read, time to think matters through, time to 
assemble information and datasets, time to prepare well for presentations and, 
perhaps more importantly of all, time to think about what you want to work on and 
when.
30 
These advantages are not enough to ensure survival, let alone long-term success, in 
the jungle. Even so, and perhaps unsurprisingly, it is useful to think through how to 
best capitalise on your existing training and strengths when in the jungle. Moreover, 
watch out for some of the bad habits that can be picked up during graduate school; 
according to friends and foes alike many academic economists came across as 
arrogant ideologues who are unworldly and do not appear to listen to others.
31 
 
3.2 On  Form 
  
The following recommendations concern skills or habits you ought to acquire and 
things to watch out for in the jungle. 
 
vii) Not everything in the jungle is written down--so learn to listen 
 
Although trade negotiations, trade policy decisions, and the like produce vast 
quantities of documentation, for very good reasons not everything is written down. 
Much of "how the jungle really works" can only be picked up by listening carefully, 
which is not something academic economists reared in a "me first" manner are often 
that good at. Moreover, listening to a broad range of views requires having contacts 
and this highlights the need to build a network in the jungle. You can't learn 
everything about the jungle, or even a small part of it that you are interested in, by 
sitting in your university office. One payoff from such a network is that it reduces the 
chances your research doesn't fall foul of some important policy-relevant detail--and 
so fail the "laugh test."
32 
 
vii) Learn to write 
 
                                                            
30 This is not to say that researchers face no time constraints (after all, there are only 24 hours in a 
day) but typically they are less time-pressed than most who operate in the trade policy jungle. 
31 I can't imagine what they are referring to. 
32 As Lars Brink put it to me, what appear to academics as small policy or institutional errors can make 
policymakers and their advisers dismiss findings, even if the academic has convinced himself or her-
self that the errors have no bearing on the key findings of their analysis.   15
Writing clearly and succinctly is a serious asset in the trade policy jungle as so much 
turns on being able to communicate ideas clearly to non-economists.
33 Many of the 
latter do not share the assumptions of orthodox economists and certainly don't write 
in the styles used by academic economists. I have four tips in this regard. First, for 
some excellent pointers as to how to write you really ought to read George Orwell's 
classic short essay titled "Politics and the English Language".
34 Even though this 
essay was published in 1946 Orwell's recommendations to writers, especially those 
writing for a broad audience, are still relevant today. Plus, his observations about the 
inter-relationship between imprecise writing and the quality of thought are worth 
considering in an age of sound-bites, bullet points, PowerPoint presentations, etc. 
Below I reproduce two of Orwell's pearls of wisdom: 
 
"A scrupulous writer, in every sentence that he writes, will ask himself at 
least four questions, thus: What am I trying to say? What words will 
express it? What image or idiom will make it clearer? Is this image fresh 
enough to have an effect? And he will probably ask himself two more: 
Could I put it more shortly? Have I said anything that is avoidably ugly?" 
(Orwell) 
"But one can often be in doubt about the effect of a word or a phrase, 
and one needs rules
35 that one can rely on when instinct fails. I think the 
following rules will cover most cases: (i) Never use a metaphor, simile 
or other figure of speech which you are used to seeing in print, (ii) 
Never use a long word where a short one will do, (iii) If it is possible to 
cut a word out, always cut it out, (iv) Never use the passive where you 
can use the active, (v) Never use a foreign phrase, a scientific word or a 
jargon word if you can think of an everyday English equivalent, and (vi) 
Break any of these rules sooner than say anything outright barbarous. 
These rules sound elementary, and so they are, but they demand a 
deep change of attitude in anyone who has grown used to writing in the 
style now fashionable. One could keep all of them and still write bad 
English, but one could not write the kind of stuff that I quoted in those 
five specimens [of allegedly bad prose, incidentally two of which were 
written by professors!] at the beginning of this article" (Orwell). 
Another way to improve your written English is to read high quality English on a 
regular basis. Probably the only reason to read The Economist is because it is written 
so well. As to the quality of the Economist's reporting, its coverage of trade policy is 
often woeful. A substitute is to read Paul Krugman's earlier books for policy 
audiences, in particular, The Age of Diminished Expectations. Finally, if you can 
tolerate centre-right/right-wing political views and have any interest in the United 
Kingdom, then consider reading the magazine The Spectator
36 (where writers put a 
premium on clarity, good form, humour, and retaining the attention of the audience.) 
                                                            
33 Richard Baldwin reminded me just how difficult this can be. He rightly notes that many economic 
arguments involve simultaneous equations where everything-affects-everything-else. Capturing the 
insights, especially from general equilibrium models, is not a trivial matter. There is a risk of oversim-
plification, which does a disservice to the policymaking audience.  
34 This essay can be downloaded from the following internet site:  
http://www.george-orwell.org/Politics_and_the_English_Language/0.html 
35 Orwell was candid enough to admit that he has probably broken some of these rules from time to 
time! 
36 Not to be confused with its cousin on the other side of the Atlantic, The American Spectator.    16
The third tip is to spend some time at an international organisation where you have to 
write a substantial report for an audience of jungle inhabitants. Throughout this 
assignment your powers of exposition will improve markedly. (Mine did). 
 
Finally, it cannot be stressed enough that parsimony and succinctness are real 
virtues in writing for policymakers. The demands on the latters' time, and on the 
people who advise them, appear enormous. As a result they simply don't have time 
to read convoluted, poorly explained papers. As a general rule, the more senior the 
policymaker the shorter the ideal length of a document. For experts in government 
agencies papers of 5,000-10,000 words in length are fine.
37 In the old days (that is, 
when I went to university
38) apparently the norm was for British government ministers 
and senior officials to read briefing papers that were around 2,000 words long.
39 
Apparently, nowadays many ministers prefer to read only a couple of pages and a 
certain Prime Minister is (I am reliably informed) only prepared to read one page-long 
briefing papers! The point to take away is that now you have fewer words to (i) state 
what the policy question is, (ii) explain its commercial, political, and other 
significance, (iii) describe any pertinent evidence or information that should be taken 
on board, including what actions other policymakers have decided to take or are 
likely to take, (iv) describe and assess a number of policy options available to the 
decision-maker, (v) make recommendations as to what to do and what not to do, (vi) 
state any caveats or risks involved with the recommended course of action (without 
undermining your case), and (vii) conclude with an informative summary of the main 
points made. 
 
ix) Perfect your presentational skills 
 
Along with maintaining an up-to-date and accessible personal website
40, giving 
presentations is another very important means of disseminating your research 
findings. Policymakers and senior officials are typically bombarded with lots of 
information and advice, and so it is important that your presentation and associated 
recommendations stand out. If you are invited to give presentations to an audience of 
policymakers and their advisors, please observe the following rules: 
 
•  Stick to the time limit given to you. Never overrun. 
•  If using PowerPoint, in addition to a cover slide, use no more than one slide for 
every four or five minutes of presentation time.
41 
•  If possible, have your PowerPoint slides circulated at the meeting or 
conference. Listeners will often write notes on the handouts and you will be 
able to speak (a little) faster. 
•  Find out in advance if your presentation is going to be translated 
simultaneously. If so, plan on speaking even slower than usual. 
•  Be prepared to give your presentation without PowerPoint slides; logistics 
don't always work out the way they should. 
                                                            
37 Except legal experts, who seem unfazed by documents that are hundreds of pages long! 
38 For the record 1987-1990. 
39 That's why (I was told) economics undergraduates at Cambridge and Oxford are made to write es-
says of a comparable length. It was said to be good training for a job at Her Majesty's Treasury. 
40 I thank Gary Hufbauer for reminding me to include this particular recommendation in the paper. 
41 Few people can absorb information at a faster rate than this.   17
•  Carefully explain at the beginning of your presentation the question(s) you 
plan on addressing and why they are relevant to the policymakers present. 
•  Avoid all technical jargon. 
•  Avoid words such as "theory" and "models", use "concepts" and (even better) 
"frameworks" instead. Most non-economists in the jungle are deeply 
suspicious of economists' love of models.  
•  Be careful about how you explain the assumptions employed in your research. 
Don't say "We assume X" and then stop--your findings will be dismissed if the 
assumptions underlying it are presumed to be unrealistic or irrelevant. 
•  Avoid large tables of numbers (especially regression results) as many 
members of the jungle don't know how to interpret them quickly. Find some 
other way to summarise your empirical findings. 
•  If your findings corroborate or refute the arguments advanced by interest 
groups and, more generally, other participants in the policymaking process 
then give some thought to mentioning them. (Not every interest group's ideas 
are worth responding to.) 
•  If your findings address the merits of current proposals made by senior 
policymakers then be sure to mention them. 
•  Reiterate the policy recommendations at the end of your talk, however little 
time you have been given to speak. If you have the time, spelling out what 
your findings do not imply makes it harder for others to misrepresent your 
findings. 
•  Be prepared for an active question and answer session. 
•  Be careful with using humour, especially self-deprecating humour, as it is all 
too easily misunderstood by audiences where many different nationals are 
present. 
 
x) Cooperate with trade lawyers and diplomats 
 
The trade policy jungle has its fair share of trade lawyers and they are there for some 
pretty good reasons. Accept this and develop ways of explaining material to trade 
lawyers in terms that they understand. The payoff can be considerable as trade 
lawyers tend to know more institutional detail and negotiating history than trade 
economists, plus they read a lot more than we do. 
 
There is also plenty to learn from trade diplomats. The best of them typically combine 
an excellent technical understanding of trade law and procedures with plenty of 
economic knowledge and an appreciation of the tactics and strategy of diplomacy; all 
of which are helpful in shedding light on the decisions taken by policymakers and the 
constraints and opportunities facing various creatures in the trade policy jungle. 
Some diplomats are even genuinely interested in economics and are prepared to 
read our papers, which is an added bonus. Having said all this, it is important to 
appreciate that diplomats and trade lawyers typically have different roles than 
researchers and consequently often have different objectives, modes of argument, 
and are persuaded by different evidence than we are.  
 
4.0 Concluding  Remarks 
 
Research on the implications of trade policy options has a long and distinguished 
pedigree. At a time when trade reform is so contested it would be a pity if   18
policymakers were not given plenty of opportunities to consider the findings of well-
conceived economic research. Given the subject matter it is unsurprising that, from 
time to time, some scholars have made forays into the trade policy jungle. However, 
the moment they do so it probably (hopefully?!?) dawns upon them that the laws of 
the jungle differ from those of the faculty meeting or university senate. The purpose 
of this short essay has been not just to suggest what academic economists might do 
and look out for, but also why. This was done by examining, just as any economist 
surely would, the supply and demand for the product in question. A better 
understanding of the incentives and motives of the jungle's inhabitants may go a long 
way to raising both survival rates and the likelihood of success in this alternative 
milieu. Such an understanding might help reduce the frustrations that many 
academics have felt in dealing with those associated with the policy process and to 
dispel the impression that studying the market place for policy ideas, and the 
decision-making underlying it, is somehow less respectable than many other areas of 
economic inquiry.  
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